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isolate Serbia: Austria-Hungary is sup-
posed to pursue the creation of a new 
Balkan alliance, with Romania, Bulgaria 
and Greece, which would be in the Cen-
tral Powers’ orbit and politically directed 
against the interests of Serbia and Russia. 
Bled does not think such a plan to have 
been feasible because of the conflicting 
interests of these countries.
In 1914 the political conflict between 
Austria-Hungary and Serbia is total; mili-
tary conflict is possible, but not inevitable. 
Things changed, Bled believes, with the 
assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sa-
rajevo on 28 June 1914. Even though the 
assassination was undertaken by Young 
Bosnia’s national revolutionaries as an act 
of resistance to the occupation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, without official Serbia’s 
involvement, the strike at the dynasty was 
seen in Vienna as the strike at the very heart 
of the Monarchy and could not go unpun-
ished. Franz Joseph, consistently support-
ing a policy of peace until June 1914, now 
decides to declare war on Serbia. With the 
opposing blocs of powers joining in, the 
war takes on global proportions.    
*
Was Franz Ferdinand the “man who 
might have saved Austria”, as Carlo Sfor-
za believed in 1930? Bled does not go thus 
far. Moreover, his concluding discussion 
recognises the difficulties that Franz Fer-
dinand would have faced had he acceded 
to the throne. An autocrat disinclined 
to making compromises, a complex per-
sonality, disliked by the Hungarians, the 
Poles and the Czechs too, he would have 
met with strong opposition inside the 
Monarchy. Jean-Paul Bled’s biography of 
the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne 
gives a convincing and nuanced portrayal 
of the personal and political life of Franz 
Joseph’s ill-fated successor. With its fine 
balance between an individual life and the 
political climate in which it unfolded this 
book is also a worthwhile history of the 
Habsburg Monarchy in the last decades 
of its existence. 
Christopher Clark, tHe sleepwalkers – How europe went to war in 1914. 
London: Harper, 2012, pp. 697.
Reviewed by Miloš Vojinović*
With the approach of the centenary of 
the outbreak of the First World War, the 
literature dealing with the greatest con-
flict the world had seen ever before grows 
rapidly. The book reviewed here is written 
by the Australian historian Christopher 
Clark, professor of German and mod-
ern European history at the University 
of Cambridge. His earlier books mainly 
deal with German history, and the two of 
them that stand out are a history of Prus-
sia: Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall 
of Prussia, and a biography of the last 
German Emperor: Kaiser Wilhelm II: A 
Life in Power. 
Clark’s book on the origins of the 
First World War is based on ample 
source materials. Apart from the archives 
in London, Paris, Vienna and Berlin, he 
also used, with the help of assistants and 
translators, materials from archives and 
libraries in Sofia, Belgrade and Moscow. 
Clark’s interpretation of the origins of 
the Great War is predicated on two as-
sumptions which are implicitly threaded 
throughout the fifteen sections of the 
book, and which he struggles to prop us-
* MA student of History, Faculty of Philo-
sophy, University of Belgrade
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ing a selective approach to facts and easy 
analogies between past and present. One 
assumption is that it actually was the Al-
lied powers (Triple Entente) that dictated 
the pace of international relations, both in 
the years before the war and during the 
July Crisis. The other is that the assassina-
tion of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the 
throne is an act unjustly neglected in the 
literature about the war. Comparing the 
assassination to the attack on the World 
Trade Center on 11 September 2001, 
Clark argues that this event, of great sym-
bolic significance, rendered “old options 
obsolete” (p. xxvii). In the picture of rela-
tions among the great powers as gradually 
painted by Clark the passivity of German 
and Austro-Hungarian politics stands 
out as a dominant feature. Its purpose 
is to prove that the nature of decisions 
made in Vienna and Berlin was mostly 
defensive, a mere response to the actions 
of other, mostly aggressive, powers. At 
the same time, the reader is presented 
with arguments which are supposed to 
demonstrate that the Franco-Russian Al-
liance was a destabilising factor in inter-
national relations, and that this alliance 
“marked a turning point in prelude to the 
Great War” (p. 131). According to Clark, 
it was this alliance that created the trigger 
which was activated at the border of Aus-
tria-Hungary and Serbia in the summer 
of 1914. Clark refers to the “Balkan in-
ception scenario”, with France and Russia 
preparing an in-advance interpretation of 
the crisis for the moment it should erupt 
in the Balkans. He further argues that the 
realisation of Serbian and Russian objec-
tives required war (p. 350), and that the 
Franco-Russian alliance and the begin-
ning of the “Balkan inception scenario” 
allowed Russia to start a European war in 
support of its objectives (p. 293). In this 
way, the “Balkan inception scenario” that 
ties France and Russia to the destiny of 
the “intermittently turbulent and violent 
state [Serbia]” (p. 559), is what lies at the 
core of Clark’s explanation of the events 
that led Europe into the First World 
War.
In Clark’s view, German politics was 
determined by the aggressive politics of 
the Entente. Presented facts primarily 
aim to show differences between the Ger-
man Empire and its rivals. Clark claims 
that Russian public opinion was chauvin-
istic and that Russia is the only to blame 
for the start of the European arms race 
(p. 87). He also claims that pan-Slavism 
“was no more legitimate as a platform 
for political action than Hitler’s concept 
of Lebensraum” (p. 279). If Clark uses the 
Lebensraum (living space) concept as an 
example of illegitimate political platform, 
why does he not inform his readers that 
it was not just Hitler’s: it was created by 
the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel 
precisely in the period covered by Clark’s 
book. The influence of the Lebensraum 
concept was very strong in Wilhelm-
ine Germany. This can be inferred even 
from Clark’s book where, on page 179, he 
quotes Kaiser Wilhelm’s speaking about 
the growing German population and lack 
of food for it and about underpopulated 
eastern parts of France, and suggesting to 
the U.S. ambassador that France should 
move its borders to the West. The Ger-
man Kaiser showed familiarity with the 
Lebensraum concept, but Clark does not 
conclude that; instead he seeks to convince 
us that the Kaiser’s impulsivity essentially 
had no effect. It is not our intention to 
defend the legitimacy of pan-Slavism, 
nor is it to deny anti-German sentiment 
in the Russian press. We believe it impor-
tant, however, to draw attention to Clark’s 
tendentious selectivity. From Clark’s book 
one can learn incomparably less about 
German society than about French or 
Russian, and the anti-German sentiment 
remains unexplained. In 1913, head of 
the German general staff, Helmuth von 
Moltke, had forecast a racial conflict be-
tween Slavs and Germans in the near 
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future. Believing that racial differences 
between them were insurmountable, he 
claimed that it was the duty of all states 
that carry the flag of German culture to 
prepare themselves for it. This information 
or, for that matter, any other that could 
add nuance to Clark’s black-and-white 
picture did not find its way into his book; 
in other words, selectivity in presenting 
facts is its salient feature.1 Clark’s overall 
antipathy towards Russia, and sympathy 
for the Habsburgs, has also been noticed 
by Maria Todorova.2
If a French politician harboured 
anti-German sentiments, Clark expect-
edly portrays him in negative terms. So, 
Theophile Delcassé is aggressive and lacks 
wisdom, and Maurice Paléologue is an 
unstable Germanophobe. As for the po-
litical views of the French ambassador in 
Berlin, Jules Cambon, who believed that 
France was to blame for the deterioration 
of Franco-German relations in the years 
preceding the war, Clark obviously agrees 
and has nothing to add. Aware that the 
topic of German militarism often features 
prominently in the historiography of the 
First World War, he does not fail to ad-
1 A. Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the 
Origins of the First World War (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 152, 285. This is 
especially important because it is Clark 
(The Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of 
Prussia [Allen Lane, 2006], 608, who points 
to an interesting detail from the history of 
the First World War – the first German vic-
tory over Russia was not named after the 
place where the battle took place, but after 
Tannenberg, a place some thirty kilometres 
away: “The name was deliberately chosen in 
order to represent the battle as Germany’s 
answer to the defeat inflicted by Polish and 
Lithuanian armies on the knights of the 
Teutonic Order at the ‘first’ battle of Tan-
nenberg in 1410.”
2 M. Todorova, “Outrages and Their Out-
comes”, The Time Literary Supplement, 4 
January 2013.   
dress it. So, we can read that the milita-
rists in Paris and St. Petersburg were in a 
better position to influence their govern-
ments’ decisions than those in Berlin (p. 
333). In pre-war Germany, according to 
Clark, civilian supremacy over the mili-
tary authorities remained intact (p. 334). 
If it is true, how should one interpret the 
fact that in the order of precedence Ger-
man chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, the 
highest civilian official with the rank of 
major, was below all colonels and gener-
als attending official royal receptions?3 It 
seems appropriate to quote the words of 
the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister 
Leopold Berchtold: “Who rules in Ber-
lin, Moltke or Bethmann Hollweg?”4 If 
civilian supremacy remained intact, how 
come that not a single civilian represen-
tative was present at the well-known war 
council of 8 December 1912.5 At the 
same time, Germany’s aggressive diplo-
matic practice was, according to Clark, a 
mere response to the aggressive politics of 
France and Russia (p. 326).
Clark’s apologia of German politics 
continues in his account of Anglo-Ger-
man relations. He points out that prob-
lems in Anglo-German relations were 
often result of the British neglect of basic 
German interests (sic!), and claims that 
the new system of relations channelled and 
intensified hostility towards Germany (p. 
159ff ). British foreign secretary Edward 
Grey is portrayed as a Germanophobe and 
a lonely fanatic. But, since Clark makes a 
very tendentiously selective use of facts 
in depicting the role of prominent politi-
cians in pre-war Europe, he fails to tell 
us that Grey, from the beginning of his 
3 H.-U. Wehler, The German Empire 1871–
1918 (Bloomsbury Academic, 1997), 156.
4 Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke, 285–
286.
5 H. Strachan, The First World War, vol. I To 
Arms (Oxford University Press, 2003), 52.
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term of office in 1905, was under attack 
from both the public and Foreign Office 
staff for his alleged complaisant attitude 
towards Germany.6 At the same time, this 
presumed complaisance, along with the 
alleged Liberal neglect of the needs of the 
British army, was a target of harsh attacks 
by the Conservative opposition.7 It seems 
obvious why Clark does not present these 
facts: by portraying Grey as a radical lon-
er, he wants to question the validity of the 
British decision to enter the war.8 Seeking 
to debunk the justification for this deci-
sion, as well as the justification for the 
anti-German sentiments of French and 
Russian diplomats, Clark seeks to chal-
lenge one of the most widely accepted 
conclusions of the historiography of the 
First World War. As Hew Strachan states, 
the best way to grasp the consequences of 
German foreign policy is through the fact 
that it made Great Britain, France and 
Russia overcome their own differences 
within a very short period of time. Not 
many years before the Entente Cordiale 
of 1904 and the Anglo-Russian Agree-
ment of 1907, such balance of power had 
seemed completely unthinkable.9 Clark 
unconvincingly argues that the assertion 
that Germany brought isolation on itself 
“is not borne out by a broader analysis of 
the process” (p. 159). At no point does 
6 Z. S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign 
Policy 1898–1914 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), 94 and 125.
7 E. H. H. Green, The Crisis of Conservatism: 
The Politics, Economics and Ideology of Brit-
ish Conservative Party 1890–1914 (London 
2012), 27.
8 Clark follows Niall Ferguson’s ideas pre-
sented in The Pity of War. Ferguson, on the 
other hand, says for the Sleepwalkers: “It 
is hard to believe we will ever see a better 
narrative of what was perhaps the biggest 
collective blunder in the history of interna-
tional relations”.
9 Strachan, First World War I, 20.
Clark approach Great Britain’s decision 
to enter the war with the question: was 
the decision to confront the threat of 
having one hegemonic power ruling the 
continent revolutionary, or was it in ac-
cordance with the well-established tradi-
tions of British diplomacy? 
The reader is told that the Entente was 
the black sheep of pre-war Europe; that its 
strategists did not realise that they were 
narrowing the range of options to Berlin 
(p. 353); and that its armament prevented 
Germany from implementing any policy 
other than the policy of force (p. 358). 
Clark claims that Germanophobes tend-
ed to speak in general terms, and that they 
would become very shy when speaking 
about specific German acts (p. 162). Iron-
ically, it is Clark who can be described as 
very shy when he speaks about the events 
that cannot be so comfortably fitted into 
his explanatory schema. For instance, he 
does not speak about the Bosnian Crisis 
(1908) as an event that reflected political 
tensions in Europe. The crisis that ended 
with one great power (Germany) present-
ing another (Russia) with an ultimatum 
does not seem sufficiently important to 
Clark, and he mentions it only in order to 
demonstrate the aggressiveness of Serbian 
and Russian policies. For Clark, the Aus-
tro-Hungarian act of annexation, which 
in fact was the unilateral breach of an 
international treaty, was merely a “nomi-
nal change” from occupation to annexa-
tion (p. 34). Clark’s perspective changes 
when it comes to another crisis: he shows 
understanding for the German stance 
during the Morocco Crisis, because “the 
German viewpoint was legitimate in legal 
terms” (p. 159). 
As in the case of Germany, Clark like-
wise sees Austro-Hungary as a passive 
participant in international relations un-
luckily troubled by a problematic neigh-
bour. The Austro-Hungarian ban on all 
Serbian associations in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina in 1913 is seen as a response to 
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Serbian ultra-nationalism (p. 76); and the 
behaviour of the Austro-Hungarian Em-
pire in the summer of 1914 as shaped by 
the complexity of Serbian politics (p. 96). 
Parts of the book which deal with Austro-
Serbian relations are used as a platform 
for demonstrating Habsburg moral and 
political superiority over the Kingdom of 
Serbia. While mainly restricting his look 
into the past to the decade preceding the 
war in the case of practically all countries 
involved in the July Crisis, in the case of 
Serbia he goes as far back into the past 
as the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury in order to prove the allegedly dis-
tinctive nature of Serbian history, finding 
that the idea of Great Serbia “was woven 
deeply into the culture and identity of the 
Serbs” (p. 22). Clark takes over, without 
quoting, Holm Sundhaussen’s essentialist 
assumption of a distinctive “mental map 
of Serbia”, which, faced with the ethno-
political realities in the Balkans, became 
a perpetual element of instability. We are 
told that this discrepancy between vision 
and reality meant that the “realisation of 
Serbian objectives would be a violent pro-
cess” (p. 26). Avoiding any comparative 
effort, Clark sees Serbia’s foreign policy 
as an element of instability; by contrast, 
the Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy is 
seen as a key to the security of the region. 
To complete the picture “of unstable el-
ement”, Clark more than once, both di-
rectly and indirectly, alleges a connection 
between Serbian prime minister Nikola 
Pašić and the assassination plans (pp. 56, 
407 and 467). The fact that such a con-
nection was not proved at any point does 
not seem to be a limitation to him.
At one point, Clark finds himself in 
a predicament: how to justify Habsburg 
rule over the minorities in Austria-Hun-
gary and, at the same time, to condemn 
the Serbian plans that were facing “com-
plex ethnic realities”. This is where the 
moralising aspect of his narrative comes 
to light. In contrast to Serbia, a retrograde 
country that treated territories gained in 
the Balkan Wars “as a colony” (p. 43), a 
country that had committed many atroci-
ties in these wars, we see the Austro-
Hungarian Empire, a country that in the 
memory of its subjects evoked an image 
of “white, broad, prosperous streets ... that 
stretched like rivers of order, embracing 
the lands with the paper white arm of 
administration” (p. 71), a country which 
amazed its visitors by the fairness of its 
regime, where “there was a tone of mu-
tual respect and mutual toleration among 
the ethno-religious groups” (p. 76). If it 
was so, what could possibly prompt Han-
nah Arendt to say that anti-Semitism as 
an ideological power in the years before 
the First World War “reached its most 
articulate form in Austria”?10 Yet another 
author, Carl Schorske, has devoted con-
siderable attention to anti-Semitism in 
Austria-Hungary.11 What the minority 
rights could have been like if Alan Sked 
describes the position of one of them as 
follows: “Only hope available to Slovaks 
seeking escape from Magyarisation was 
emigration”?12 If we remember the or-
ganised, and government-tolerated, at-
tacks on Serbs in Zagreb in 1897 and in 
1902, it becomes quite difficult to accept 
Clark’s views on the Austro-Hungarian 
regime. Perhaps the best assessment of 
the position of minorities in Austria-
Hungary was given by Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand. When Hungarian politicians 
expressed the wish for Bosnia and Herze-
govina to be placed under the direct con-
trol of Budapest, the Archduke remarked: 
“Bosnians would fight tooth and nail not 
10 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 42.
11 C. E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Po-
litics and Culture (Vintage Books, 1981), 
116–146.
12 A. Sked, The Decline and Fall of Habsburg 
Empire 1815 –1918 (Longman, 1989), 217.
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to become Hungarian subjects, and op-
pressed like the other non-Hungarian na-
tionalities that enjoy all the ‘benefits’ that 
Hungarian government has to give.”13
The reader will find no mention of 
the fact that Serbia had universal suffrage, 
and no information on how and with 
how many MPs non-Magyar communi-
ties were represented in the Hungarian 
Diet. Clark is content to say that there 
was an unmistakable progress in the mi-
nority rights policy. Vienna brought peace 
and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
relying on “cultural and institutional con-
servatism, not a philosophy of colonial 
domination” (p. 74). The features of Aus-
tro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herze-
govina, such as a fivefold increase in taxes, 
a strong military presence, the mainte-
nance of the Ottoman feudal system, the 
“divide and rule” policy pitting different 
ethnic groups against each other,14 lead 
Clark to conclude that the Austro-Hun-
garian government was guided by the 
principle of “gradualism and continuity” 
(p. 74). Not all historians would agree 
with Clark, to mention but the promi-
nent expert on Austria-Hungary Alan 
Sked: “If all this did not represent impe-
rialism, it is difficult to know what it did 
represent.”15 Clark claims that “most in-
habitants of the Habsburg Empire associ-
ated the state with the benefits of orderly 
government: public education, welfare, 
sanitation, the rule of law etc.” (p. 71). The 
effect of the thirty years of gradualism, 
continuity and orderly government in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was the illiterate 
accounting for 87 percent of the popula-
tion and five times as many police stations 
13 V. Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914 (Belgrade: Pros-
veta, 1966), 220.
14 Sked, Decline and Fall of the Habsburg 
Empire, 245–246.
15 Ibid. 245.
as schools.16 Clark makes every effort to 
convince his readership that there was not 
a single reason why the Serbs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina should be dissatisfied 
with Austrian rule; apart from Serbian 
nationalism. To the same end, Clark fails 
to mention that Austria left the Ottoman 
feudal system intact, which was one of 
the main causes of the Serbs’ discontent. 
After the First World War, an Austrian 
politician wrote about feudalism in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina: “Plainly, no one 
has ever stopped to consider the impres-
sion bound to be made by this on mind 
of a population which knows that across 
the Drina and the Sava rivers there is no 
subasha to appropriate third of a harvest 
every year for some aga or beg.”17 Intent 
on showing, in spite of all the well-known 
facts, that anti-Austrian sentiment was 
unjustified, Clark claims that “by 1914, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina had been developed 
to a level comparable with the rest of the 
double monarchy” (sic!) (p. 75).
Clark’s narrative is also a geopoliti-
cal one. The minorities in the Habsburg 
Monarchy and their aspiration for their 
own national states is treated as a disturb-
ing historical fact, because the creation of 
new entities “might cause more problems 
than it resolved” (p. 71). Clark more than 
once abandons the perspective of science, 
he does not try to elucidate or to inter-
pret; instead, he judges the past from the 
viewpoint of the present: “from perspec-
tive of today’s European Union we are 
inclined to look more sympathetically 
than we used to on the vanished imperial 
16 H. Sundhaussen, Historische Statistik Ser-
biens 1834 –1914 (Munich: Oldenburg Ver-
lag, 1989), 541.
17 J. M. Baernreither, Fragments of a Political 
Diary (Macmillan and Company, 1930), 27. 
Maria Todorova, “Outrages and Their Out-
comes”, also points out Clark’s diregard of 
the importance of the agrarian question in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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patchwork of Habsburg Austria-Hunga-
ry” (p. xxvi). Moreover, Clark’s perspective 
intertwines with the Austrian imperial 
perspective. This is most evident when he 
writes about the aggressiveness of Aus-
trian foreign policy during the Balkan 
Wars. The reader is led to believe that 
the change in Austrian politics “looked 
like a moderate response to the dramatic 
changes” (p. 282) and that Austria had ev-
ery right to weaken its neighbour because 
the Serbian success in the Balkan Wars 
meant the failure of Austria’s Balkan pol-
icy (p. 281). Clark does not see irony and 
contradiction when he states that Austria 
decided to oppose Serbian rapacious and 
voracious politics with the idea of “the 
Balkans for Balkans people” (p. 282). Not 
for a single moment does Clark make an 
effort to depict Austro-Serbian relations 
as a process in which there were two sides, 
each pursuing its own goals and interests; 
instead, we have the picture of a prosper-
ous and civilised state which offers good 
living and strives for peace, and a miscre-
ant of Serbia: the only cause of instability 
and regional problems, which would soon 
engulf the entire continent, lay in Serbian 
nationalism. The Greater Serbian idea 
prevented Serbs, Clark claims, from living 
peacefully not only in prosperous Austria 
but also in the provinces of the Ottoman 
Empire which were “cosmopolitan” in 
character (p. 31)!
Gavrilo Princip’s shots are not placed 
in the context of other assassination at-
tempts on Habsburg officials, such as 
those in Galicia in 1908, in Zagreb in 
1912 and in the Romanian-inhabited 
part of Hungary in 1914;18 neither does 
ethnically motivated political violence 
18 Larry Wolff, The Idea of Galicia: History 
and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture 
(Stanford University Press, 2010), 331–333; 
V. Ćorović, Odnosi Srbije i Austro-Ugarske u 
20. veku (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1922), 618; J. 
Horvat, Pobuna omladine 1911–1914 (Za-
in other countries, such as the assassina-
tion of the Russian governor in Helsinki 
in 1904,19 seem to be worthy of mention. 
Had Clark put Princip’s act in some kind 
of relation with these events, their com-
mon denominator would be the policy to-
wards minorities in the empires, growing 
nationalisms on the entire continent and 
the growing feeling that political violence 
was appropriate strategy – some historians 
have even called the period between the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century and 
1914 the “golden age” of political assas-
sinations.20 But finding some other cause 
apart from Serbian nationalism does not 
fit Clark’s goals. 
Clark’s biased one-sided perspective is 
most evident in his notion of crisis: crisis 
does not mean instability, increased risk 
or possible escalation. In spite of the fact 
that the Austrian ultimatum was written 
so as to be rejected, which Clark admits 
himself (p. 457), and that the Austrian 
ambassador in Belgrade received instruc-
tions to reject Serbia’s reply regardless of 
its content,21 Clark claims that Russian 
politics enabled and permitted escala-
tion of the crisis (pp. 480 and 483). From 
the author’s specious argument it follows 
that what led to the war was not Austria’s 
decision to attack Serbia, or Germany’s 
decision to stand by Austria, but Russia’s 
decision to stand by Serbia. 
greb: SKD Prosvjeta, Gordogan, 2006), 
127–211.
19 T. R. Weeks, “Managing Empire: Tsarists 
nationalities policy”, in The Cambridge His-
tory of Russia, vol. II Imperial Russia 1689 
–1917, ed. D. Lieven (Cambridge 2006), 
40.
20 The Cambridge History of Nineteenth Cen-
tury Political Thought, eds. G. S. Jones & G. 
Clayes (Cambridge 2011), 247.
21 F. Fellner, “Austria-Hungary”, in Decisions 
for War, ed. K. Wilson (UCL Press, 1995), 
15.
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Clark’s explanation of Austria’s politics 
in July 1914 is based on the presupposi-
tion that the assassination rendered “old 
options obsolete” (p. xxvii). But a pertinent 
question arises: was the Austrian politics in 
July 1914 really new? How new the war 
option was if Conrad von Hotzendorf, 
chief of the Austrian general staff, urged 
attack on Serbia twenty-five times in 1913 
alone?22 Hotzendorf noted in 1907 that 
“only aggressive” politics could bring suc-
cess. That Hotzendorf was not lonely in 
his belligerent attitude, as Clark suggests, 
is evident from the instruction he had re-
ceived from the Austrian foreign minister 
Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal: “The goal of 
[Austrian] Balkan policy is the annexa-
tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in-
corporation of parts of Serbia.” This same 
instruction states that the rest of Serbia 
should become Bulgarian.23 This instruc-
tion had been created in December 1907; 
obviously, Austria-Hungary’s top officials 
had contemplated destroying Serbia al-
most eight years before the Sarajevo as-
sassination.
Clark does not quote this part of 
Hotzendorf ’s memoirs, but he does re-
sort to them when they appear suitable 
to corroborate his picture of the peaceful 
nature of Austrian politics (pp. 105 and 
117). Clark has every reason to ignore 
such passages, because Hotzendorf ’s tes-
timony can reveal major gaps in his ar-
gument. If we accept Clark’s claim that 
decision makers in Vienna were gradually 
provoked into giving up their aversion to 
extreme measures (p. 291) by the aggres-
siveness of Serbian public opinion during 
the Bosnian Crisis, by organisations such 
as National Defence or Black Hand, and 
also by Serbian politics during the Bal-
22 Strachan, First World War, 69.
23 Feldmarschall Conrad, Aus meiner Dienst-
zeit 1906–1918 (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 
1921), 528, 537. 
kan Wars – how come that the Austrian 
foreign minister had wanted to destroy 
Serbia in the winter of 1907? What kind 
of Serbia’s action could have provoked 
Austria-Hungary in 1907, when none of 
the abovementioned organisations, Na-
tional Defence, Black Hand or Young 
Bosnia, had existed? It is quite clear that 
Vienna had thought of destroying Serbia 
long before 1914, even before the Bosnian 
Crisis in 1908, which renders the thesis 
of Austria’s gradual change of politics un-
tenable. Clark does not write about the 
Pig War which “started” in 1906 either. 
The Austrian attempt to crush Serbia ec-
onomically, by closing its borders to Ser-
bia’s most important export product, just 
because Serbia had signed an economic 
agreement with Bulgaria, a country which 
did not even share borders with Austria, 
could not be easily fitted into Clark’s pic-
ture of Austria-Hungary as a benevolent 
and peaceful neighbour. This is where it 
becomes obvious why Clark avoids writ-
ing about the Bosnian Crisis. The epi-
sode in Austro-Serbian relations where 
Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and threatens to attack Serbia, and where 
Serbia responds with public outburst of 
anti-Austrian sentiment and creates Na-
tional Defence for rapid mobilisation in 
the event of war, which could be summed 
up as “Austria acts and Serbia responds”, 
not the other way around, does not seem 
to be appropriate for Clark. 
If the assassination was not just a pre-
text for war, as Clark claims, why does he 
not quote the joyful comment made by 
senior officials in Austrian foreign min-
istry at the news of the assassination: 
“This is a gift from Mars.”?24 Clark does 
not mention correspondence between the 
Austrian and German chiefs of the gen-
eral staff, Conrad von Hotzendorf and 
24 N. Stone, Europe Transformed 1878–1918 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 247.
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Helmuth von Moltke, who, at the end of 
the Balkan Wars, expressed the opinion 
that a suitable casus belli should be found 
as soon as possible.25 An ultimatum was 
not a new instrument; Austria used ul-
timatums during the Bosnian Crisis and 
the Balkan Wars, not just against Serbia, 
but also against Greece.26 For Clark, the 
fact that the Kingdom of Serbia was not 
willing to submit its foreign policy to 
Austrian interests means that Austria had 
justifiably lost confidence in diplomatic 
procedures (p. 285). Pointing out that one 
Serbian politician wrote, back in 1844, 
that there could be no agreement between 
Serbia and Austria (p. 28), and making a 
cynical remark that the Austrian ultima-
tum was perhaps asking for the impos-
sible – to halt the expansionism of ethnic 
Serbia (p. 467), Clark gives final touches 
to his picture of Serbia as a perpetual ele-
ment of instability.
While writing about the last days of 
the July Crisis, Clark rounds off his pane-
gyric to one warring party and indictment 
for the other. Like in other parts of Sleep-
walkers, incomparably more attention is 
devoted to hawks – militarists and aggres-
sive politicians – in France and Russia 
than in Germany and Austria-Hungary. 
For Clark, the most important decision in 
July 1914 is not Vienna’s decision to draw 
up an ultimatum that could not be com-
plied with,27 or Berlin’s decision to give 
25 A. Kramer, Dynamics of Destruction (Ox-
ford University Press, 2007), 75–76.
26 F. R. Bridge, “Foreign Policy of the Mon-
archy”, in The Last Years of Austria-Hunga-
ry. A Multi-National Experiment in Early 
Twentieth Century Europe, ed. Mark Corn-
wall (University of Exeter Press, 2006), 29.   
27 The wife of the Austrian foreign minis-
ter Leopold Berchtold recalled: “…poor 
Leopold could not sleep on the day he 
wrote his ultimatum to the Serbs as he was 
so worried that they might accept it. Several 
times during the night he got up and altered 
Vienna a carte blanche; the key event is 
Russian mobilisation, which is a provoca-
tion to Germany. In Clark’s understanding 
of the concept of crisis, to resist means to 
cause. It is a fact, and historians are well-
aware of it, that from 6 July, when Austria 
received a blank cheque from Germany, 
until 23 July, when Austria sent the ul-
timatum, it was Austria that dictated the 
tempo of international relations.28 Clark, 
however, tries to repudiate it by claiming 
that the system was fast and unpredict-
able (p. 557). The answer to the question 
as to how a local, Balkan, conflict could 
spread to the entire continent, he finds 
in Russia’s actions; Germany and Austria 
in fact wanted localisation of the conflict, 
not a European war, but it was made im-
possible by the Russian decision to de-
fend Serbia. If we choose not to comment 
Clark’s perception of local war as being a 
good thing in itself, we should not leave 
uncommented his claims that Austria-
Hungary and Germany did everything 
they could to prevent a European war. 
American historian Graydon Tunstall, 
who has devoted a book to Austrian mili-
tary planning prior to 1914, states that 
it is obvious from the documents of the 
Austrian high command that the Austri-
an military knew that a war against Serbia 
most likely meant a war against Russia.29 
When Franz Joseph was warned by one 
of his ministers that the ultimatum would 
bring about war with Russia, the Austrian 
emperor replied: “Certainly, Russia cannot 
or added some clause, to reduce the risk”, cit. 
in Sked, Decline and Fall of Habsburg Em-
pire, 248.
28 Strachan, First World War, 75.
29 G. A. Tunstall, Jr., “The Habsburg Com-
mand Conspiracy: The Austrian Falsifica-
tion of Historiography on the Outbreak 
of World War I”, Austrian History Yearbook 
XXVII (1996), 181.
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possibly accept this note.”30 Even when it 
became clear to Berlin that Russia would 
not abandon Serbia, Bethmann Hollweg 
just continued his earlier politics.31
Sleepwalkers are not a methodologi-
cally coherent book. At the famous Ger-
man military council held on 8 Decem-
ber 1912, the Kaiser and highest-ranking 
officers agreed that war was inevitable 
and that it would be better for Germany 
if it came sooner than later. As this im-
portant episode was impossible to avoid 
completely, Clark mentions it briefly, de-
nying its importance and claiming that 
the meeting had no consequences. His 
approach is different when it comes to 
the opposing bloc, including Serbia. He 
does not attach importance to the fact 
that a ruler of a great power with the 
most powerful and numerically strongest 
army had accepted that war should come 
in the near future, and that the same ruler 
gave a blank cheque to Austria less than 
two years after the December meeting. 
On the other hand, the fact that Clark 
sees as being of consequence for the war 
of 1914, and thus deserving of a place 
in a book about the origins of the Great 
War, is the statement of a Serbian politi-
cian from 1844 that agreement between 
Serbia and Austria is impossible. Apart 
from this mid-nineteenth century state-
ment, Serbia’s alleged guilt for war is cor-
roborated by the events from the end of 
the twentieth century: “since Srebrenica 
and the siege of Sarajevo, it has become 
harder to think of Serbia as a mere object 
of great power politics”, and “it is easier to 
conceive of Serbian nationalism as an his-
torical force in its own right” (p. xxvi). So, 
he would have it that 1844 and the 1990s 
are more relevant and closer to 1914 than 
1912. Clark’s methodology is obviously 
30 Sked, Decline and Fall of Habsburg Em-
pire, 257.
31 Strachan, First World War, 86.
arbitrary; it is there only to prop his argu-
ment. Sleepwalkers do not offer a scientific 
inquiry that follows the evidence to see 
where they lead, they pick from the body 
of evidence to support a preconceived 
conclusion.
Faced with strong arguments that 
German aggressiveness is to blame for the 
creation of another bloc in Europe, Clark 
rejects any causal relationship between 
German foreign policy and the creation 
of alliances. He struggles to show that the 
alliances did not have to be shaped as they 
were in 1914, and that German politics 
did not raise fears in other countries. As 
for the outbreak of the war in the west of 
Europe, Clark, unable to use the black-
and-white villain/victim pattern, as he 
does in the case of Serbian-Austrian rela-
tions, claims that it came as a consequence 
of numerous temporary changes. It is 
known that Alfred von Schlieffen’s plan, 
developed from the 1890s, had envis-
aged a simultaneous German war against 
France and Russia;32 it is also known that 
the contemporaries had described the 
Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 as a 
revolution in international relations.33 If, 
with this in mind, we also remember that 
in the years before the war Great Brit-
ain, concerned for the safety of the Isles, 
transferred most of its naval forces to the 
North Sea,34 and if Clark himself states 
that the German ambassador in Lon-
don had been informed in 1912 that in 
the event of war between Germany and 
the Franco-Russian alliance Great Brit-
ain would side with German enemies (p. 
329), it becomes extremely difficult to ac-
cept Clark’s idea of temporary changes.
32 H. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Si-
mon & Schuster 1995), 204–206.
33 W. Mulligan, The Origins of the First World 
War (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 49.
34 Kennedy, British Naval Mastery, 220–229.
Balcanica XLIV (2013)432
The book before us offers a biased 
interpretation of the events that took 
Europe to the First World War. It offers 
a defence of German politics as against 
blunders and unjustified attitudes of lead-
ing politicians in the countries that op-
posed Germany and Austria-Hungary, 
a narrative of the Habsburgs’ moral and 
political superiority over Serbia, that per-
petual element of instability. However 
hard one searches through Sleepwalkers 
for even a slightest hint that the Central 
powers contributed to the outbreak of war 
in any way, the search will be a futile one. 
Instead, the author speaks of “obscure and 
convoluted events that made such car-
nage possible” and “complex war causal-
ity”. It is precisely by means of this kind 
of vague and ambiguous statements that 
Clark evades answers to many important 
questions. Although he insists that he 
is not interested in “why” questions be-
cause they are associated with war guilt, 
his alternative approach is just as much 
connected with question of war guilt. As 
Todorova noted, Clark often confuses in-
tentions with causes. At the same time, 
while he “assiduously pretends to avoid 
the why questions”, Clark surreptitiously 
does build his causal explanation.35  
Clark is very often uninterested in 
what the necessary prerequisites for the 
war to happen were. His attention is go-
ing in a different direction. He holds that 
the contemporary system of international 
relations, which replaced the bipolar sta-
bility of the Cold War period, is in a state 
that calls for comparison with 1914. In 
that sense, Sleepwalkers has some features 
of a partisan political pamphlet, and the 
author offers his view of the nature of 
international relations. Clark insists that 
observing the Austrian ultimatum to Ser-
bia only in terms of violation of Serbia’s 
35 Todorova, “Outrages and Their Out-
comes”.
sovereignty does not give the right picture. 
He finds it mild in comparison with the 
NATO ultimatum to Yugoslavia in 1999 
(p. 456), and does not know what kind of 
comparison Edward Grey may have had 
in mind when he described it as “the most 
formidable document ever sent from one 
nation to another”. To make it clear what 
he means, Clark draws a strange analogy 
between Serbia in 1914 and Syria in 2011: 
Russia’s and China’s opposition to inter-
vention has made further massacres pos-
sible, and they have done it by insisting on 
Syrian sovereignty (p. 559). Clark’s anal-
ogy between Serbia and Syria is one last 
call to his readers to appreciate Austria’s 
politics. The fact that the first massacres in 
1914 were committed by Austrian troops 
in western Serbia does not seem relevant. 
The reader cannot but feel greatly disap-
pointed. The promising book of an estab-
lished and well-known historian turns 
out to be little more than a collection of 
unproven assumptions, which sometimes 
sound as if they were produced by one 
of the warring parties eager to place the 
blame on “the other” and depict its own 
conduct as plain self-defence. The most 
dangerous aspect of Clark’s book lies in 
the way in which his already equivocatory 
arguments may be interpreted, as Clark’s 
last interview blatantly shows: it was con-
veniently titled “Suicide bomber triggered 
the First World War”, and Gavrilo Prin-
cip’s act reached proportions comparable 
to Al Qaeda.36 Perhaps the best descrip-
tion of Clark’s book is given by Maria 
Todorova: “Christopher Clark is a gifted 
and informative storyteller; it is a pity 
that he is also a moralizing one.”37




37 Todorova, “Outrages and Their Out-
comes”.   
